🔗 Share this article

During the first week of December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, striking sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

These divergent actions exemplifies the core tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on commerce and ending wars—despite the fact that this squares with the emerging aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson reinforced this, noting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This change is major, but analysts caution it is early to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a senior fellow for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Tensions

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major disagreement has developed with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Relations and Selective Action

An analogous standoff emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Experts describe the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the current policy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.